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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE EDWARD WIKER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent-
Cross Appellant 
VS. 
ELAINE WIK.ER, 
Defendant-Appellant 
No. 15326 
RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Appellant filed a Petition For Modification 
of Decree of Divorce, For Contempt and For Order to Show 
Cause [R. 77-80] in the District Court for Salt Lake County 
seeking to modify the decree of divorce by increasing child 
support for the minor child, Verlin Kay, to $100.00 per 
month, to increase alimony to $200.00 per month, and to 
collect alleged delinquent child support for the child, 
Roger Allen Wiker, resulting from Plaintiff-Respondent's 
discontinuing such support after Roger turned eighteen years 
of age. Defendant-Appellant also sought attorney's fees and 
to punish the Plaintiff-Respondent for contempt. 
L 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Defendant-Appellant's request 
for modification of the decree and increased support for the 
remaining minor child to $100.00 per month and increased 
alimony to $150. 00 per month. The court denied the claim 
for support payments for Roger after his eighteenth birthdav 
and dismissed the contempt portion of the order to show 
cause. The court awarded Defendant attorney's fees of 
$200.00. [R. 112-113] Defendant appealed the denial of her 
petition for delinquent support payments for Roger Allen 
Wiker. [R. 114] Plaintiff cross-appealed the lower court's 
decision increasing child support for the minor child, 
Verlin Kay, and increasing alimony. [R. 124 ] 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant seeks an order 
affirming the District Court's order and judgment denying 
Defendant-Appellant's claim for support payments for Roger 
Allen Wiker after May 2 7, 197 5, which is Roger's eighteenth 
birthday. In addition, Plaintiff-Respondent, in his Cross 
Appeal seeks a reversal of the lower court's findings of 
changed circumstances and of its order and judgment increasi"' 
alimony and child support. 
2 
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EXPLANATION OF PARTIES AND ABBREVIATIONS 
George Edward Wiker, Plaintiff in the original divorce 
action filed April 29, 1964 [R. 4] is the Plaintiff-Respondent-
Cross Appellant in this case. He will be referred to in 
this brief by his name or, where appropriate, as Plaintiff. 
Elaine Wiker, Defendant in the original suit and 
Petitioner in this action will be referred to by her name, 
or as Defendant. 
[R.] is a reference to the Record in this case. 
[Tr.] is a reference to the Transcript in this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this action were granted a divorce on 
January 29, 1965. [R. 21] The original divorce decree 
awarded custody of the two youngest minor children, Roger 
Allen, then age 7, and Verlin Kay, then age 4, to Defendant, 
Elaine Wiker. [R. 22] Plaintiff, George Wiker, was ordered 
to pay $50.00 per month as support for each child as well as 
$45.00 per month as alimony with alimony to increase to 
$70.00 per month upon the eldest son's (Raymond) return from 
his mission. [R. 22] Plaintiff was awarded custody of two 
older minor children, Jeanne, then age 15, and George Martin, 
then age 14. [R. 22] The decree also made a division of 
the property of the parties. [R. 21-23] 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Pursuant to an Order to Show Cause filed by Defendant, 
the decree was modified and amended on August 3, 1966, to 
give custody of Jeanne to Defendant and to require Plaintif'. 
to pay $50. 00 per month child support for her. [R. 31-32] 
The decree of divorce was further modified and amended 
on October 19, 1967, whereby Defendant was awarded care an<l 
custody of George Martin Wiker, then age 17, and Plaintiff 
was ordered to pay $40. 00 per month temporary support money 
for said son. [R. 56] By an order and amendment of decree 
dated November 29, 1967, Plaintiff was ordered to pay child 
support in the amount of $50. 00 per month for George Martin 
and to pay George Martin's dental bills. [R. 72] 
On March 31, 1971, Defendant's employment was terminatec 
because she was "too slow and not too accurate in counting," 
[Tr. 24] and because of "illness and physical problems." [R. 
110] In December 1971, she was hospitalized for an operation 
[Tr. 24] 
The next and last modification and amendment to the 
decree prior to the instant order to show cause, occurred in 
October 1973. [R. 107]. (The Findings of Fact No. 2 showing 
October, 1974 appears to be in error [R. 109]). This 
amendment to the decree is acknowledged by the trial judge 
as follows: 
"2. That subsequent to said decree o~ ·<"'-
divorce the same was amended, whereby plainnit' 
' · d lun-obliga tion to pay support was increas~ vo tober oi 
tarily, pursuant to letter agreement in Oc 
1974." [R. 109] 
4 
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The Record is not totally clear as to all the details 
surrounding the October 1973 amendment. However, it is 
clear there were a series of letters written by Allen 
Hodgson, Family Court Cormnissioner [R. 108] whereby the 
financial, health and other circumstances of the parties 
were considered [R. 107] and the decree amended to increase 
Plaintiff's payments to Defendant from $170.00 ($50 per 
child child support and $70 alimony] to $220.00 per month 
"in support and alimony." [Tr. 21-23; R. 107-109). We do 
not know how much of this $220.00 was for alimony and how 
much for child support. Neither Mr. Hodgson's letter [R. 
107] nor the testimony of the parties in court in the 
instant action clarifies this matter. [Tr. 21-23). 
However, we do know the October 1973 amendment to the 
decree was based upon changed circumstances which occurred 
subsequent to the entry of the November 1967 modification 
but prior to October 1973, and we further know these are the 
same changes in circumstances alleged to exist in the 
instant case. These changed circumstances included Defendant's 
loss of employment, her illness, and her operation in 1971, 
and her subsequent inability to work full-time. These were 
offset by the fact her home had been completely paid for so 
she no longer had to make house payments; she was now 
receiving disability payments from Social Security in the 
amount of approximately Two Hundred Dollars ($200) per month 
lr,vhich is t!"le same income she had in 1964 when the original 
5 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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1 
complaint was filed [R. 5] and also at the time of the 196; 
modification [R. 54]]) and her part-time work for and recei··· 
r· 
of goods from church welfare. [R. 107] 
In 1974, the minor child, Verlin Kay, had rheumatic 
fever [Tr. 28] which was covered by Plaintiff's insurance. 
[Tr. ll-12]. Since that time his illness has only required 
medication and an annual physical check-up. At the time of 
trial he had recovered to the extent he was in the Hawaiian 
Islands working in a pineapple plantation. [Tr. 9-10] 
In March 1975, the Utah Legislature passed a statute 
amending Sec ti on 15-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, lowering the 
age of majority for males from 21 to 18. The statute was 
made effective May 13, 1975. Laws of the State of Utah, 
1975, p. 121. Roger Allen Wiker, child of the parties in 
Defendant's custody, reached age eighteen, his statutory a~ 
of majority, on May 27, 1975. [Tr. 4-5] Relying on the 
advice of counsel, Plaintiff ceased paying support for Roger 
after that date. [Tr. 5] 
On August 23, 1976, Defendant filed the Petition for 
Modification of Decree of Divorce, For Contempt and For 
Order to Show Cause [R. 77] that initiated this proceeding 
In her petition Defendant sought to increase alimony and 
support and to collect support for Roger after he reaclied 
age eighteen. The District Court increased alimony to 
$150. 00 per month and child support for the one child Verlin 
6 
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Kay to $100.00 per month. The Court denied Defendant's 
claim for support for Roger after he reached age of majority. 
[R. 112-113) 
7 
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POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED AMENDED SECTION 
15-2-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, PROSPECTIVELY, NOT RETROACTIVELY, 
IN DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION FOR 
ROGER CEASED WHEN ROGER TURNED EIGHTEEN BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
VESTED RIGHT IN FUTURE CHILD SUPPORT AND BECAUSE THE COURT 
TERMINATED CHILD SUPPORT ONLY AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF 
THE STATUTE AND AFTER ROGER REACHED AGE EIGHTEEN, THE AGE OF 
MAJORITY UNDER THE AMENDED STATUTE. 
The general rule of law, adopted by the Supreme Court 
of Utah and applicable in this case, provides that ordinarily, 
legislative enactments are applied prospectively and may not 
operate retrospectively or retroactively. McCarrey v. Utah 
State Teachers' Retirement Board, 111 Utah 254, 177 P. 2d 
725, (1947); In re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P. 
2d 340, (1944). Defendant has alleged the District Court 
applied 15-2-1, as amended, retroactively. The Utah Supreme 
Court, when confronted with a claim that a lower court had 
incorrectly applied an amended workman's compensation statute 
retroactively, defined retroactive application of a statute 
as follows: 
"A statute is not made retroactive merely because 
it draws on antecedent facts for its operation. 
(Citations omitted). A law is retrospective, in 
its legal sense, which takes away or imnairs 
vested rights acquired under existing laws:" 
Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P. 2d 689, 692 
(1954). [Emphasis added] 
It therefore appears the first test to be applied in 
determining whether a statute is being applied retroactive 
8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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is to see whether any vested rights are taken away or impaL, 
The answer to this question depends upon the nature of t~ 
decree awarding child support payments to Roger. If all 
future child support payments vest automatically when the 
decree is entered and cannot be modified nor changed, then 
the subsequent statutes can have no affect upon the child 
support payments and they must continue until the specified 
period has ended. If on the other hand the future child 
support payments do not vest until their monthly due date, 
it follows they can be changed or modified by the courts at 
any time prior to their due date but not after that time. 
In Utah, the law is that the right of the trial court 
to modify an alimony or support money award does not extend 
to installments which have already accrued and which are 
past due, because the right to collect such installments 
becomes vested upon their due date. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 
105 U. 574, 144 P. 2d 528 (1943), and Cole v. Cole, 101 Utah 
355, 122 P. 2d 201 (1942), and cases cited therein. Consequer: 
the courts in Utah may not impair past due installments of 
alimony and child support but they can modify those install~e: 
that will become due in the future. 
In the instant case, the trial judge did not attempt tc 
apply amended Section 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 to 
any past due installments of child support payments· Rather 
he applied the statute only to those installments that 
. h 
become due after the effective date of the amendment whiC · 
9 
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was May 13, 1975, and after the minor child Roger became 
eighteen years of age which was may 27, 1975. This conclusion 
by the trial judge is amply demonstrated in paragraph one 
(1) of his Conclusions of Law which reads as follows: 
"l. That the defendant should be denied judgment 
against plaintiff for the claim for delinquent 
support payments for the minor child Roger Allen 
Wiker, in that he turned age eighteen (18) on or 
about May 27, 1975. That the Court concludes that 
the law as amended by the Utah Legislature in the 
year 1975, relieved plaintiff from paying support 
for said minor child after age eighteen (18) under 
the Decree of Divorce herein." [R. 110] 
Moreover, the doctrine of "vested rights" has never been 
interpreted to mean that a parent or child has the right to 
support payments for any definite period of time, and age of 
majority statutes in affect at the time the divorce decree 
is entered do not change that result. Schmitz v. Schmitz, 
Wis. , 236 N.W. 2d 657 (1975); Jungjohann v. 
Jungj ohann, Kan. , 516 P. 2d 904 (1973); Baril v. 
Baril, __ Me. , 354 A. 2d 392 (1976). 
Finally, the trial judge's application of 15-2-1 did 
not impair any "vested rights" under the original divorce 
decree. "To call child support payments a vested right 
misconceives their nature." Schmitz, supra, at 662. Under 
a decree providing child support until majority, a minor 
child has no vested right to support at a specific future 
date or age regardless of what age the law establishes as 
the age of majority. "(T)he rule has long been recognized 
t~at a child has no claim or vested right in future child 
~rt. (Emphasis added) Jungjohann, supra, at 908. 
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"As we have previously stated, the rights of minority are 
not fixed or vested rights .. Jungj ohann, supra, at 909 
Age of majority "is a status, modifiable by law, which has 
no vested property rights." Schmitz, supra. See also 
In dealing with virtually identical issues and similar 
circumstances as those in the case at bar, courts have 
uniformly held that applying a new age of majority statute 
to a prior divorce decree does not constitute retroactive 
application nor deprivation of vested rights. These same 
courts further hold such statutes do relieve the support-
paying parent of his obligation to contribute child support 
when the child, male or female, reaches age of majority 
under the amended statutes. Jungjohann v. Jungjohann, _ 
Kan. __ , 516 P. 2d 904 (1973); Schmitz v. Schmitz, __ 
Wis. __ , 236 N.W. 2d 657 (1975); wnitt v. Whitt, __ Tenr. 
490 S.W. 2d 159 (1973); Blackburn v. Blackburn, ~ 
Tenn. __ , 526 S.W. 2d 463 (1975); Allison v. Allison, 44 
Ohio App. 2d 230, 337 N.E. 2d 337 (1975); Baril v. Baril, 
__ Me. , 354 A. 2d 392 (1976); Shoaf v. Shoaf, 
N. C. __ , 192 S. E. 2d 299 (1972); Fellows v. Fellows, 
La. App. , 267 So. 2d 572 (1972); Baker v. Baker, 
217 Kan. 319, 537 P. 2d 171 (1975); Phelps v. Phelps, 85 
N.M. 62, 509 P. 2d 254 (1973); Lookout v. Lookout,_ 
526 P. 2d 1405 (1974); Speer v. Quinlan, Okl. App. __ , 
Idaho ll9' 525 P. 2d 314 (1974); Ga rev v. Garev, _ Tenn 
__ , 482 S.W. 2d 133 (1972). 
ll 
96 
I 
_.....l 
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In Schmitz, supra, the divorced husband, following 
enactment by the legislature of the statute reducing the age 
of majority to eighteen years, ceased making support payments 
for children who had reached ages 19 and 20 as of the 
effective date of the statute. The divorced wife petitioned 
the court to require the divorced husband to continue support 
payments. The trial court denied the wife's petition. The 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed, stating: 
"In refusing to order further payments the 
trial court noted that the phrase 'minor children' 
was the crucial language of the decree, and that 
the twenty-one age reference was merely descrip-
tive of the then existing majority status. A new 
majority status being defined by Ch. 213, Laws of 
1971, the court noted that the decree's application 
ceased for those children who attain or attained 
eighteen years." Schmitz, supra, at 661. 
As to the wife's claim [exactly as the wife Mrs. Wiker 
alleges in the instant case] that the trial court incorrectly 
applied the new age of majority statute by applying it 
retroactively, the Supreme Court held: 
"To the extent that the new act does not demand 
the return of payments made for the parties' 
children who were over age eighteen prior to the 
effective date of the law, retroactive application 
is clearly avoided. (Emphasis added). Schmitz, 
supra, at 662. 
Similarly, in the case at bar, the amended statute (15-
2-1) became effective on May 13, 1975, while the child, 
Roger, was only seventeen years old. The Court did not 
apply the statute to support which accrued and was paid 
£Iior to the effective date of the statute and prior to 
Roger's eighteenth birthday. Nor did it apply the statute 
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to recover support paid by plaintiff for another child, 
George Martin Wiker, for the years after George reached 
eighteen. These two app 1 ica tions would have been retroacti;c 
Amended Section 15-2-1 was applied to Roger's support 
prospectively only, that is, only to support claimed~ 
the effective date of the statute and after Roger's eighteen:· 
birthday. 
The divorce decree in Jungj ohann, supra, provided child 
support until the daughter reached age of majority. At the 
time the decree was entered, the age of majority in Kansas 
was 21 years. The daughter turned 18 on August 5, 1971. 
The Kansas legislature reduced the age of majority to 18 
effective June 1, 1972. In determining the father's child 
support obligation, the Kansas Supreme Court held: 
"We hold that where by a decree of divorce a 
defendant is required to make child support 
payments until a child has reached her age of 
majority the duty imposed by such decree is . 
terminated by K. S .A. 1972 (Supp. 38-101) [amendea 
Kansas age of majority statute] on the effective 
date thereof ... Jungjohann, supra, at 909. 
(Parenthetical explanation and Emphasis added)· 
The court in Jungj ohann further held that even though 
the divorce decree was entered prior to the effective date 
of the statute, application of the amended age of majoricy 
statute to child support payments after the statute's 
effective date constituted prospective application, not 
retroactive, and did not run counter to the rule against 
retroactive application of statutes. The court concluded 
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"The ruling of the trial court terminated support 
payments prospectively from and after July 1,-
1972. No application was made nor order entered 
herein which attempted to operate retrospectively 
back to the eighteenth birthday of Elizabeth. The 
statute made eighteen the age of majority from and 
after July 1, 1972. It affected no rights accrued 
before that date. It did not reach back ... but 
only operated from and after the effective date of 
July 1, 1972. [Emphasis added] Jungjohann, 
supra. 
By the same token, amended Section 15-2-1 of the Utah 
Code made 18 the age of majority from and after its effec-
tive date. It did not attempt to terminate the support 
payments after the person's 18th birthday when that birthday 
occurred prior to the effective date of the act, rather it 
operated from and after its effective date of May 13, 1975 
and this is the way the trial court applied it. 
14 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED SECTION 15-2-1 
u.c.A. 1953, AS AMENDED, IN THIS CASE WITHOUT VIOLATING 
ARTICLE I SECTION 18 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHICH PROHIBITS 
EX POST FACTO LAHS OR LAWS IlfPAIRING CONTIACT OBLIGATIONS 
BECAUSE SECTION 15-2-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, AS AMENDED, WAS 
NOT APPLIED EX POST FACTO OR RETROACTIVELY AND BECAUSE 
DIVORCE DECREES ARE NOT CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE. 
Article I, Section 18, Utah Constitution, prohibits the 
enactment of ex post facto laws or laws impairing the obli-
gation of contracts. Defendant contends that in light of 
this Constitutional provision, Section 15-2-1 should have 
had no retroactive effect. Plaintiff has already argued 
that the District Court, in the case at bar, applied 15-2-1 
prospectively, not retroactively. [Rather than repeat those 
arguments and citations, reference is made to Point I, 
above, of this brief. ] 
In the case of Allison v. Allison, suora, where the 
court faced issues very similar to those in the case at bar, 
the custodial parent alleged the apolication of the new age 
of majority statute violated the constitutional prohibition 
of ex post facto laws. The Ohio appellate court responded: 
"We do not think this is the type of ex post facto action 
which Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution is 
designed to prevent." Allison, at pp. 667-8. 
As to defendant's impairment-of-contracts argument, she 
seeQs to assume, without foundation or support, that a 
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divorce decree occupies the status of or is in the nature o'. 
a contract. In Whitt v. 11hi tt, supra, the husband reduced 
his child support payments for his eighteen-year-old daughte: 
when the legislature lowered the age of majority from 21 to 
18. The wife attempted to enforce the parties' divorce 
settlement agreement provisions which required support until 
the former age of majority on the grounds such an agreement 
was a binding contract. The Supreme Court didn't disagree 
that the agreement, standing alone, was a contract, only 
that the divorce decree was not a contract. The Court held 
that: 
"When the trial judge accepted this agreement of 
the parties. . . and incorporated it in the decree, 
the agreement became merged into the decree and 
lost its contractual nature. Whitt, sunra, at 
160. -- ~
The reason divorce decrees are not deemed to be contracts or 
contractual in nature "is the continuing statutory power of 
the trial court to modify its terms when changed circum-
stances justify." Penland v. Penland,~~ Tenn. 521 
S.W. 2d 222 (1975) at 224; Blackburn, ~, at 465. 
Thus, it is clear that the District Court's application 
of Section 15-2-1 in this case does not violate ex post 
facto and impairment of contract prohibitions of the Utah 
Constitution. 
16 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR rn 
HOLDrnG THAT PLAINTIFF'S OBLIGATION TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT 
CEASED WHEN THE CHILD REACHED AGE EIGHTEEN BECAUSE THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 
DECISIOHS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PROHIBIT ANY 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN MALE AND FEl1ALE AS TO AGE OF MAJO!UTY IN 
THE CONTEXT OF CHILD SUPPORT AND BECAUSE THIS COURT HAS 
ALREADY DETERMINED AGE OF MAJORITY FOR FEMALES TO BE EIGHTEEN; 
BECAUSE THIS COURT HAS ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT ITS DECISION AS 
TO AGE OF MAJORITY OF FEMALES HAD THE EFFECT OF IMPOSING 
MAJORITY ON BOTH MALES AND FEMALES AT AGE EIGHTEEN; AND 
BECAUSE THE AMENDMENT TO SECTION 15-2-1 UCA, 1953, CLARIFIES 
THE LAW AND ESTABLISHES AS PUBLIC POLICY THE AGE OF MAJORITY 
AT AGE EIGHTEEN. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution guarantees to individuals 
the equal protection of the laws and limits the power of 
states to legislate or accord different treatment to individuals 
according to differing classifications. Although it does 
not preclude legislative classifications altogether, it 
requires that, 
"A classification must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and must rest upon some ground of dif-
ference having a fair and substantial relation to 
the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-14, 43 L. Ed. 
2d 688, 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975), quoting from 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 30 L.Ed. 2d 225, 92 S. 
Ct. 251 (1971). 
The Stanton case just cited is one of a series of cases 
under the same name that dealt with the issue of whether the 
Utah statute which specified a greater age of majority for 
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males than for females denied, in the context of a parent's 
child support obligation, the equal protection of the lam 
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In analyzing 
this is sue, the United States Supreme Court set forth the 
following test: 
"The test here, then, is whether the difference;. 
sex between children warrants the distinction in ... 
the appellee' s obligation to support that is dw;:: 
by the Utah statute. Stanton, supra, at 14, 43 
L.Ed. 2d 688, 95 S.Ct. 1373. 
The Court's holding in that case was clear and un-
equivocal: 
"We therefore conclude that under any test--
compelling state interest, or rational basis, or 
something in between--§15-2-1, in the context of 
child support, does not survive an egual protectir 
attack. In that context, no valid distinction 
between male and female ma be drawn." [Emphasis 
added Stanton, supra, at 17, 43 L.Ed. 2d 688, 95 
S.Ct. 1373. 
The importance of the Stanton decision is that the Court 
made clear that in any situation or circumstance in the 
child support context, both male and female children mus: :e 
treated as reaching the age of majority at the same age. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Utah 
statute unconstitutional, it did not attempt to fix the age 
of majority for Utah. Rather, it remanded the case for soc'. 
determination to the Utah Court. On remand, this Court 
concluded that females reach the age of majority at age 
eighteen. Stanton v. Stanton, 552 P. 2d 112 (Utah 1976) · !~ 
the early Stanton cases the age of the male child was neve 
"called into question." Stanton, supra, at 113. However, 
the Utah Supreme Court recognized that under the equal 
18 
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protection clause its decision as to females would ultimately 
and inevitably be applied to males in the same context. 
T~us, after some further proceedings, this Court concluded, 
in an opinion by Justice Hall, that, 
" ... the prior decision of this court, made at a 
time when the age of majority statute was invalid, 
and which determined that females reached the age 
of majority at age eighteen, had the effect of 
imposing majority upon both males and females at 
age eighteen. The amendment to Section 15-2-1 has 
seemed to further clarify the status of Utah law 
and establishes as a matter of public policy the 
age of majority for both sexes at age eighteen." 
[Emphasis added] Stanton v. Stanton, 564 P. 2d 
303, 304-5 (Utah 1977). 
Plaintiff admits the Utah Court's determination of age 
of majority for males has force only as dictum. However, 
the Court's decision that females reach age of majority at 
age eighteen leads necessarily to the application of that 
age to males because: 
"The thrust of Stanton I, and therefore the starting 
point for the Utah Court on remand, was that males 
and females cannot be treated differently for 
child support purposes consistently with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution." 
[Emphasis added] Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501, 
503, 50 L. Ed. 2d 723, 97 S. Ct. 717 (1977). 
Thus, whether by extension of the age of majority for 
females to males under the equal protection clause, or 
directly under the Utah Supreme Court's determination of age 
eighteen for men, the result is the same, to-wit: the age of 
~ajority for both males and females for child support purposes 
is and must be eighteen. Any contrary holding by this court 
would deprive the plaintiff of his equal protection of the 
law and would be therefore unconstitutional. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN HE 
INCREASED THE ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT BECAUSE THEY HAD 
BEEN INCREASED, IN OCTOBER 1973, BASED AS THE SAME SET OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES ALLEGED IN THE IHSTANT MOTION AND ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE. 
It is firmly established in Utah law that the party 
seeking to modify a divorce decree must prove that "material" 
circumstances have "substantially" changed since the original 
decree or the most recent or subsequent modifications or 
amendments were adopted. Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P. 
2d 986 (1953); Ring v. Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P. 2d 155 
(1973); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P. 2d 277 
(1936). Such a change in circumstances must be substantial 
and may not include factors which "were within the knowledge 
and contemplation of the court when the modified order was 
entered ... " Hears v. Mears, Iowa ___, 213 N.W. 2d 
511 (1973). Especially important in the case at bar is the 
requirement that the changes in circumstances must be oermanent 
and continuous, not temporary, Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 
1, 47 P. 2d 394 (1935); Spaulding v. Soaulding, __ Iowa 
__ , 204 N.W. 2d 634 (1973); Heidemann v. Heidemann, 96 
Idaho 602, 533 P. 2d 96 (1974); Murphy v. Murphy, 26 Ariz. 
App. 302, 547 P. 2d 1102 (1976); and the requirement that 
such changes must have occurred or arisen since the date of 
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the most recent proceeding which considered the situation of 
the parties. Dworak v. Dworak, Iowa 
740 (1972); Haase v. Haase, Colorado 
I 195 N.H. 2d 
376 P. 2d ___ , 
698 (1962); Spaulding, supra; Mears, supra. 
Following the trial of this matter the lower court 
concluded there had been a change of circumstances and 
ordered an increase in support and alimony. (R. 110-111] 
The Findings of Fact of the lower court indicate the change 
of circumstances upon which the court's order was based: 
"4. That since the entry of said decree of divorce 
and the amendments thereto, the defendant has 
experience a change of circumstances in that she 
has become disabled due to illness and phvsical 
problems ... 
"S. That subsequent to the decree of divorce, the 
minor son, Verlin Kay, suffered rheumatic fever. 
"6. That subsequent to the decree of divorce, the 
defendant has experienced a change of circum-
stances in that the costs of living have increased 
substantially. . " [R. 110] [Emphasis added] 
Plaintiff submits the court's Findings of Fact i~umber 4 
is contrary to the evidence which clearly shows disability 
due to illness and physical problems occurred ~ to the 
last amendment in October 1973, and was in fact specifically 
relied on by the Family Court Connnis s ioner as a groi.md for 
increasing the alimony and support payments at that time. 
[R. 107] The modification to the decree by the Family Court 
Commissioner is acknowledged by the court in Finding of Face 
number 2 which states: 
"2. That subsequent to said decree of divorc~, ,., 
the same was amended, whereby plaintiff's obllgat·· 
21 
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to pay support was increased voluntarily, pursuant 
to letter agreement in October of 1974. (R. 
109] [The date of October 1974 appears to be in 
error since the letter agreement referred to is 
dated October 1973. See R. 107] 
The record is not totally clear as to all the details surrounding 
the October 1973 amendment. However, it is clear that there 
was a series of letters written by Allen Hodgson, Family 
Court Commissioner [R. 108], whereby the financial, health 
and other circumstances of the parties were considered [R. 
107] and the decree amended to increase plaintiff's payment 
to defendant from $170 per month for the support of two 
minor children and the wife to $220 per month for the same 
number of persons. Unfortunately neither the Family Court 
Cormnissioner in his letter decision [R. 107) nor the trial 
judge in his findings, conclusions, or decree [R. 109-113] 
ever stated how much of this $220 monthly support payment 
was for alimony and how much was for child support for each 
of the minor children. 
However, the Family Court Commissioner did clearly 
state the changes in circumstances he was considering. He 
states: 
"Your former wife has responded to my letter of 
October 11. Her health will not oermit her to 
work more than about three davs a·week for church 
welfare, where she is permitted to work at her own 
pace. She receives food and clothing in return 
for that work. She has never been advised of the 
monetary value of the food and clothing but I 
assume it would not average more than $100.00 per 
month. Her disability is such that she receives 
$200.00 per month from Social Security. 
"She acknowledges that the house is now paid for 
and she is relieved of the $81.00 per month 
payment." [R. 107] 
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It appears clear the wife's total disability as determfoe:' 
by the Family Court Co=issioner had not worsened between 
October 1973 and the date of the hearing in the instant 
case. [R. 107, Tr. 23-26, 36 and particularly lines 18-20] 
The wife was still able to work for church welfare assistance 
at the time of the hearing to the same extent she had in 
October 1973. [Tr. 36] Consequently, there was no basis 
for increasing the alimony in this regard. 
Furthermore, the social security payments had increased 
from $200 per month in October 1973, to $221. 60 at the time 
of the instant hearing. [Tr. 26] Both of those amounts are 
the same as the wife was earning in 1964 when the original 
decree was filed [R. 5] and in 1967 at the time of the first 
modification [R. 54]. Consequently, the wife's income was 
the same in 1964, 1967, 1973, and 1977 and consequently 
could not be any economic basis for justifying an increase 
in alimony. In addition the wife's house was paid for by 
October 1973 and that gave the wife an added economic 
benefit of Eighty-one Dollars ($81) per month that she did 
not have earlier. [R. 107] 
The lower court also erred in finding the son's rheUI!IE.tic 
fever with its resultant costs [Finding {fa5, R..110] constitutec 
sufficient grounds for increasing Plaintiff's support and 
alimony obligations. The cases cited in the first paragraoh 
of this Point establish the rule that a change in circumstance' 
must be permanent and continuous, not temporary. Verlin 
23 
+ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
suffered rheumatic fever in "the middle of March in '74." 
[Tr. 28] His recovery was so complete as to allow him to 
spend the summer of 1977 working full-time on a pineapple 
plantation in the Hawaiin Islands. [Tr. 9-10] At the time 
of trial Verlin's bout with rheumatic fever only required 
him to undergo an annual physical check-up [Tr. 28] and to 
take 30t worth of medication per day (2 tablets per day, 
tablets are $15. 00 per 100 or 15t each). [Tr. 28] Plaintiff 
contends this fact situation is clearly insufficient to 
support a necessary finding of either a material, or a 
permanent change of circumstances. 
As to Defendant's allegations and the court's Findings 
of Fact Number 6 that increases in the cost of living, 
inflation, standing by itself is a sufficient factor to 
warrant an increase in alimony, this conclusion is also 
erroneous. It is a circumstance that bears equally upon 
both parties and should therefore be considered irrelevant. 
In Schweidler v. Schweidler, 329 Ill. App. 643, 70 N.E. 2d 
39 (1946), the divorced wife petitioned the court to modify 
its decree of divorce to increase alimony. As one of the 
grounds for her petition she alleged the increased cost of 
living, or inflation. On appeal the court held that the 
increased cost of living "is il!IIllaterial and need not be 
considered" since "such fact affects both parties similarly." 
Clearly Defendant has failed to establish that the 
circumstances of her health and finances have changed since 
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the date of the most recent amendment or proceeding which 
was October 1973. With respect to the instant hearing 
vis a vis the 1973 amendment hearing, the court's statement 
in Haase, supra is pertinent: 
"Although we do not have the benefit of a transcrip· 
of the hearing first held on the original petition· 
for modification, it is clear from the testimony 
in the second hearing that the alleged changes of 
circumstances were exactly the same ... (S)uffice 
it to say that the court in the second hearing was 
limited to inquiry into a change--if any--since 
the last order. Haase, supra, at 699. 
Plaintiff submits the lower court also erred in its 
statement at trial that the divorced wife is entitled to any 
increases in her husband's income after the divorce. In 
Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P. 2d 525 (Utah 1976), where alimony was 
reduced from $300. 00 per month to $1. 00 per year, this Court 
held that: 
"Although an increase in the income of a divorced 
wife does not, of itself, determine a reduction of 
alimony; neither does an increase in the income of 
a divorced husband, of itself, determine the 
maintenance of alimony." Dehm, supra, at 528. 
Similarly, the Arizona Appellate Court denied a petition for 
increased alimony, holding that: 
"An increase in the earning capacity of the 
husband after the divorce, standing alone, how· 
ever, is not sufficient. A former wife has n~ 
continuing right to share in future accumul~tl~ 
of wealth by her divorced husband." [Emphasis 458 added] Sheeley v. Sheeley, 10 Ariz. App. 318, 
P. 2d 522 (l969) at 525. 
Similarly, "The defendant's increase in income does not 
necessarily require an increase in his obligations to the 
plaintiff. . . " Hunsaker v. Fake, 563 P. 2d 784 (Utah 1 971 ~ 
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The plaintiff submits the above references and discussion 
amply show the trial judge had no basis for increasing the 
alimony and child support for the reasons he described in 
his Findings of Facts Numbers 4, 5, and 6 [R. 110-111]. 
Consequently, the decision of the trial judge must be reversed 
with respect to these increases. This court should further 
remand the case for the trial judge to determine what portion 
of the $220 monthly payments awarded by the Family Court 
Commissioner related to child support payments for each of 
the minor children and deduct from the $220 per month the 
amount attributable to the child Roger Allen who had reached 
majority [May 27, 1975] at the time of the instant hearing. 
In this respect the law in Utah is that the Supreme 
Court may review this case on the record and is not bound by 
the lower court's findings. Gross error is not necessary 
for reversal. In Hendricks, supra, at 279 the court said, 
"This court is required to review the evidence in 
the nature of a trial de novo on the record and 
the appellant is entitled--CO-the judgment of this 
court, as well as the trial court, on this ques-
tion." 
It has further been determined by this Court, 
"that it is not necessary for this court to find a 
gross abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
court before modifying the judgment as to alimony. 
In conclusion, plaintiff submits there has been no 
significant change of circumstance since the decree was last 
amended. All of the facts and circumstances alleged by 
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defendant and included in the Court's findings as the basis 
for increasing alimony and child support were within the 
knowledge and contemplation of the parties and the family 
court cormnissioner when Plaintiff's payments were increased 
under the 1973 amendment or modification from $170 per month 
to $220 per month. 
Plaintiff further submits the lower court's findings of 
changed circumstances are not supported by the evidence in 
this case and that any change of circumstances since 1973 is 
neither sufficient not substantial, continuous nor permanent. 
Consequently, the lower court incorrectly increased alimony 
and child support based on said findings and thereby abused 
its discretion in this matter. Plaintiff asks this court to 
correct these errors and reverse the lower court's findings, 
conclusions, judgment and order on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the plaintiff respectfully requests this 
court to reverse the trial judge with respect to the increased 
alimony and child support and to affirm the trial judge with 
respect to the child support payments for Roger Allen after 
he reached age 18. The plaintiff also requests this court 
to remand this case to the trial judge to determine what 
portion of the family court cormnissioner's $220 monthly 
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award was for alimony and what portion was for child support 
for each of the minor children and to delete from the said 
$220 that portion attributable to Roger Allen after he 
reached age 18 on May 27, 1975. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
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By 
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